The case of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery by Solís, Daniel et al.
Marine Policy 62 (2015) 347–357Contents lists available at ScienceDirectMarine Policyhttp://d
0308-59
n Corr
E-mjournal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpolIFQs and total factor productivity changes: The case of the Gulf
of Mexico red snapper fishery
Daniel Solís a,n, Juan J. Agar b, Julio del Corral c
a Agribusiness Program, College of Agriculture and Food Sciences, Florida A&M University, Tallahassee, FL 32307, USA
b Southeast Fisheries Science Center, National Marine Fisheries Service, Miami, FL 33149, USA
c Department of Economics and Finance, University of Castilla-La Mancha, Ciudad Real, Spaina r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 20 April 2015
Received in revised form
1 June 2015
Accepted 1 June 2015




stochastic frontier distance functionx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.06.001
7X/& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier
esponding Author. Fax: þ1 8504127603.
ail address: Daniel.Solis@famu.edu (D. Solís).a b s t r a c t
This study investigates changes in the total factor productivity (TFP) and identifies the main sources of
TFP growth following the adoption of an individual fishing quota (IFQ) program in the Gulf of Mexico red
snapper commercial fishery. Utilizing an unbalanced panel of 722 vertical line vessels Malmquist indices
were derived from an output-oriented stochastic distance frontier. The analysis shows that the IFQ
program had a positive impact on the productivity of the fleet and that most of the productivity gains
were due to improvements in technical efficiency. The study also finds that changes in technical effi-
ciency were time variant suggesting that the exit of the less efficient vessels and easing of command and
control regulations such as trip limits and short fishing seasons were responsible for most of these gains.
Changes in the exploitable biomass of red snapper were found to have a moderate impact on productivity
growth whereas the impact of technological progress was minimal.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Capture fisheries around the world are increasingly being
managed with individual fishing quotas (IFQs). Today, about one-
quarter of the global marine harvest is managed with IFQs [1].
Under an IFQ program, fishers are assigned exclusive harvesting
privileges based on a share of the quota, which is expected to
balance the harvesting capacity of the fleet with the productivity
of fish stocks. Fishers are not only anticipated to use capital and
labor more wisely, but also are expected to adjust the scale and
scope of their operations by trading shares.
The rapid proliferation of IFQs has resulted in voluminous lit-
erature assessing their biological, economic and social perfor-
mance. Perusal of this large body of work suggests that IFQs with
hard quotas (or total allowable catch, TAC) have had largely posi-
tive biological impacts on target species (e.g., catches below the
TAC) but had unknown or mixed impacts on by-catch or incidental
species and the overall ecosystem [2,3]. Costello et al. [4] con-
cluded that the adoption of IFQs reduced the likelihood of stock
collapse, whereas [5] reported that IFQs have contributed to
higher catches. However, this latter claim has been challenged by
[6], who argued that some of the observed catch gains may be due
to improved catch reporting systems often concurrently put inLtd. This is an open access article uplace with IFQs. The extant economic literature has generally
viewed IFQs favorably, highlighting that a sounder incentive
structure leads to reductions in fishing effort, mitigation of derby
fishing conditions, prolonged fishing seasons, higher prices, lower
harvesting costs, improved fish handling and quality, wealth
creation, and improved safety and resource stewardship [7–12].
However, some of the anticipated benefits such as capital savings
were slower to materialize because of the non-malleability of ca-
pital and uncertainty over the worth of quota shares [13,14,11]. In
contrast, most of the literature dealing with the social impacts of
IFQs has been critical focusing on fairness and equity concerns
[9,15,16]. This literature described how the distribution and con-
centration of quota resulted in fewer at sea and on-land employ-
ment opportunities, disadvantaged small fishing communities,
lowered wages and bargaining power of crew and captains, gen-
erated class divisions, and created financial hardships for pro-
spective fishers.
One important but less studied anticipated outcome of enact-
ing IFQs has to do with quantification of productivity gains, where
these gains refer to the ability of fishing firms to harvest more fish
with the same amount of inputs or harvest the same amount of
fish using fewer inputs [17]. Theoretically, by ameliorating derby
fishing behavior, fishers can dedicate more time to harvesting,
processing and marketing their landings more proficiently. They
can also spend more time developing fishing practices that im-
prove their catch composition and make better use of their capital,
labor and other inputs. Additional productivity gains may bender the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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of quota from less to more efficient vessels [17].
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the
Gulf of Mexico (GOM) red snapper IFQ program on the total factor
productivity (TFP) of the vertical line fleet. The study also de-
composes the sources of TFP growth into technological progress,
changes in technical efficiency and stock change using a Malm-
quist Index (MI) derived from an output-oriented stochastic dis-
tance frontier (OSDF). The use of OSDF has been favored when
studying fisheries productivity since the method allows for the
random and multi-product and factor nature of the harvesting
process [18–20, among others]. The red snapper fishery was se-
lected as a case study because it is one the most valuable com-
mercial fisheries in the GOM.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. The next section
presents an overview of the management history of the red
snapper fishery, followed by a review of the literature on fisheries
productivity. Next, the data and methods are described and the
empirical model introduced. Then, the results are presented and
discussed. The article concludes with a summary of the main
findings and policy implications.2. Overview of the management history
The red snapper fishery has a long and complex management
history. Federal management began with the implementation of
the GOM Reef Fish fishery management plan in 1984 which es-
tablished minimum size fish limits. In response to declining stocks,
the GOM Fishery Management Council (Council) established a TAC
in 1990, which led to premature fishery closures. For example, in
1995 the fishing season only lasted 52 days whereas 5 years earlier
the fishing season was open year round [21,22].
In the early nineties, the deteriorating condition of the resource
and the intensification of derby fishing conditions led the Council
to lower the TAC and subsequently establish a moratorium on reef-
fish permits, impose tiered trips limits (200 and 2000 lb), and
establish a red snapper endorsement system. In 1995, a new stock
assessment indicated that the stock was in better condition than
previously believed which allowed the Council to raise the TAC. In
1996, the Council split the TAC into spring and fall fishing seasons.
The fall season was included to accommodate larger landings but
also to mitigate the market gluts caused by derby fishing behavior
[21]. Unfortunately, the larger quota and tiered trip limits and
fishing seasons failed to slow down the fishery [23].
To address the adverse socio-economic impacts of progres-
sively shorter fishing seasons, the Council limited fishing to the
first 15 days of each month (reduced to only 10 days later on) or
until the quota was reached. The Council also established a per-
manent, two tiered red snapper license system made up of Class
1 and Class 2 licenses, which allowed fishers to harvest 2000 and
200 lb trip limit, respectively. Table 1 offers a summary of the main
regulations [24].
The failure of command and control management measures to
restore the biological and economic viability of the fishery led the
Council to implement an IFQ program for the commercial red
snapper fishery on January 1, 2007. The intent of the program was
to address the problems associated with overcapacity and derby
fishing conditions. By assigning secure and tradable harvesting
privileges to fishers, the Council intended to mitigate incentives to
invest in redundant fishing capital and to harvest as fast as pos-
sible to preempt the harvesting activities of other fishers.
Since adoption of the IFQ program, significant structural
changes have taken place. Agar et al. [24], who reviewed the
performance of the first five years of the IFQ program, found sig-
nificant capital and labor savings in the fishery. Five-year pre- andpost-IFQ averages showed that the fleet size fell by 29% and that
the number of days fished and crew-days declined by 4% and 6%,
respectively. However, [20] estimated that additional savings were
required to achieve an economically optimal fleet configuration.
They estimated that one-fifth of the existing fleet could harvest
the entire quota. Improvements in the technical efficiency also
were documented [25]. Share and lease prices increased sig-
nificantly suggesting that the profitability of the fishery improved.
In addition, there were no quota overages since the IFQ program
began. However, the stock remains overfished, although it is not
undergoing overfishing [24]. The review also found that the IFQ
programwas successful in mitigating the race to fish behavior. The
fishing season expanded from a 5-year (pre-IFQ) average season of
109 days to a year-round season which allowed fishers to harvest,
process, and market their catch more efficiently [24]. Fishers also
began taking longer fishing trips and diversifying the composition
of their output mix by targeting more vermilion snapper and red
grouper (Fig. 1). Cursory review of single factor productivity in-
dices (Fig. 2) shows important productivity gains in the harvest of
vermilion snapper and red grouper and minor gains in the harvest
of red snapper following adoption of the IFQ program. However,
these partial metrics fail to account for potentially confounding
effects such as changes in resource and market conditions, which
may offer a distorted view of the productivity gains observed. The
present study sheds light on this key issue by rigorously measur-
ing productivity changes before and after the adoption of the IFQ
program.3. Literature review
Productivity is a key economic indicator used to analyze the
performance of production units [26]. In a fisheries setting, pro-
ductivity captures the relationship between the quantity of fish
produced (harvested) and the amount of inputs used. Fishing fleets
become more productive when they catch the same amount of fish
with fewer inputs. Because of the multispecies and stochastic
nature of the harvesting process different approaches have been
employed to measure TFP growth in commercial fisheries. Table 2
presents a summary of recent empirical studies in this area of
research.
The most straightforward approach is to construct productivity
indexes using index numbers, such as Laspeyres, Lowe, Fisher,
Paasche, and Törnqvist indexes. Productivity indexes have become
very popular in the literature because they are easy to calculate
and require less data when compare to other approaches [27].
Squires [28] was the first to extended the standard TFP index by
including stock abundance. He argued that industries that harvest
common-pool resources need to account for the unpriced con-
tributions from fish stocks to obtain unbiased measurements of
productivity or technical progress. In his empirical work, he used a
biomass-adjusted Törnqvist index to estimate TFP changes in the
Pacific coast trawl fishery. Following [28,29] estimated changes in
TFP in the New England groundfish fishery. Both, [28,29], con-
cluded that productivity changes are sensitive to stock abundance;
thus the omission of stock abundance in the estimation of TFP may
produce biased estimates. Stephan and Vieira [30] used a stock
corrected Fisher index to study productivity trends for key Com-
monwealth fisheries in Australia. These authors found an in-
creasing trend in productivity especially after the introduction of a
buyback program. Also using index numbers [31,32] decomposed
profit and productivity in the British Columbia halibut fishery. Fox
et al. [31] found that individual harvesting rights had a positive
effect on industry performance mainly because an increase in
output prices. Walden [33,34] found that the economic well-being
of the northeast U.S. multispecies trawl fleet increased after the
Table 1










1984 365 NA NA 13 Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan: Minimum size
1990 365 2.79 2.40 13 Amendment 1: established commercial quota, bottom longlines prohibited within 50 fathoms
west of Cape San Blas, FL and within 20 fathoms elsewhere
1991 236 1.84 2.02 13 Regulatory Amendment: reduced TAC by 20%
1992 95 1.84 2.81 13 Emergency rule: April 3–May 14 1000 lb trip limit. Amendment 4: moratorium on new reef
fish permits, emergency rules: 2000 lb endorsement or 200 lb trip limit, closed fishery De-
cember 1
1993 94 2.76 3.08 13 Regulatory Amendment: Opened February 10, one trip per day limit. Amendment 6: extended
endorsements
1994 77 2.76 2.93 14 Regulatory Amendment: Opened February 24. Amendment 5: raised minimum size over next
5 years, establish Class 1 and Class 2 licenses. Amendment 9: extended reef fish permit
moratorium
1995 52 2.76 2.65 15 Regulatory Amendment: opened February 28
1996 87 4.19 3.90 15 Regulatory amendment: Increase TAC, split quota into spring and fall seasons. Amendment
13: extended endorsement
1997 73 4.19 4.34 15 Regulatory amendment: fall season started Sept 2 for 1st 15 days/month until quota met
1998 72 4.19 4.22 15 Regulatory amendment: fall season started Sept 1, 1st 10 days/month. Amendment 15: es-
tablished permanent red snapper Class 1 and Class 2 license, allocated ⅔ quota to spring,
starts Feb 1,
1999 70 4.19 4.40 15 Interim rule: spring season reduced from 15 to 10 days/month
2000 66 4.19 4.36 15 Regulatory amendment: spring season open on February 1 for 10 days each month until
spring-quota reached (2/3 commercial quota), Fall season open October 1 for 10 days each
month until remaining quota reached. Amendment 17: extended permit moratorium for
5 more years
2001 79 4.19 4.18 15 None
2002 91 4.19 4.32 15 None
2003 94 4.19 3.99 15 None
2004 105 4.19 4.21 15 None
2005 131 4.19 3.69 15 Amendment 24: extended reef fish permit moratorium indefinitely
2006 126 4.19 4.21 15 None
2007 365 2.99 2.87 13 Amendment 26: implemented commercial red snapper IFQ program, reduced quota from
2006 level, mid-year quota increase, reduced size limit
2008 366 2.30 2.24 13 Reduced quota from 2007 level
2009 365 2.30 2.24 13 None
2010 365 3.19 3.06 13 Mid-year quota increase. Area closed due to oil spill
2011 365 3.30 3.24 13 Mid-year quota increase
2012 366 3.71 3.64 13 Mid-year quota increase
Source: Adapted from Table 1 in [24].
a Million pounds gutted weight (mp gw).
Fig. 1. Landings and revenue profiles of the US Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery.
D. Solís et al. / Marine Policy 62 (2015) 347–357 349implementation of catch shares. Other productivity studies using
productivity indexes include [35], who studied fisheries off the
coast of Peninsular Malaysia, [36], who compared the Icelandic,
Norwegian and Swedish fisheries, and [37,38], who assessed the
Lofoten fishery in Norway. One of the main drawbacks of the
productivity index approach is that by aggregating inputs and
outputs, technological interdependencies cannot be assessed.
An alternative framework to measure TFP is to use frontier
methods. These methods are based on the notion of a ‘bestpractice’ frontier which depicts the boundary of the production
possibility set. Frontier methods assess productivity changes by
measuring how the distance between the firms’ production fron-
tier and the ‘best practice’ frontier vary over time. Frontier ana-
lyses can be estimated using parametric and non-parametric
techniques. Non-parametric methods employ mathematical pro-
gramming techniques, such as data envelopment analysis (DEA), to
estimate the frontier. Conversely, parametric methods require
imposing a specific functional form and use econometric
Fig. 2. Fixed base indices for number of vessels, vessel length, days at sea and crew days.
Table 2
Recent empirical studies measuring changes in productivity in fishing.
Reference First author (year of
pub.)
Fishery (country/ies) Methoda Multi-
outputs
Control variablesb Quotas Metricsc Period of
analysis
[36] Eggert (2013) Mixed Species (Iceland, Norway,
Sweden)
PI No S No TFP 1973–2003
[19] Felthoven (2009) Pollock (USA) St Yes S, C, R Yes PC 1994–2003
[31] Fox (2003) Halibut (Canada) PI No S Yes PC, PR 1988, 1991, 1994
[32] Fox (2006) Mixed Species (Australia) PI No S Yes PC, PR 1997–2000
[37] Hannesson (2007) Mixed Species (Norway) PI No S No TFP 1961–2004
[38] Hannesson (2010) Mixed Species (Norway) PI No S No TC, TFP 1860–1983
[40] Hoff (2006) Mixed Species (Denmark) DEA Yes – No TE, SE, TC, TFP 1987–1999
[35] Islam (2011) Mixed Species (Malaysia) PI No – No TFP 1990–2005
[29] Jin (2002) Groundfish (USA) PI Yes S, R No TFP 1964–1993
[43] Kim (2012) Mixed Species (Korea) DEA Yes S No TE, SE, TC, TFP 1995–2009
[45] O’Donnell (2013) Mixed Species (Australia) St Yes C No TE, SE, TFP, EC 1974–2010
[42] Oliveira (2009) Mixed Species (Portugal) DEA Yes S Yes TE, TC, TFP 1995–2004
[28] Squires (1992) Mixed Species (USA) PI Yes S, R Yes TFP 1981–1989
[41] Squires (2008) Tuna (Korea) DEA Yes S, C No TE, TC, TFP 1997–2000
[30] Stephan (2013) Multiple fisheries (Australia) PI Yes S Yes TFP 1993–2012
[39] Walden (2012) Quahogs & Clams (USA) DEA Yes S Yes TE, SE, TC, TFP 1980–2008
[33] Walden (2013) Groundfish (USA) PI Yes – Yes TFP/EHI 1996–2010
[34] Walden (2014) Groundfish (USA) PI Yes S Yes TFP/EHI 2007–2011
a Stochastic (St) Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Productivity Index (PI)
b Stock (S); Climate (C); Regulations (R); Quotas (Q).
c Technical Efficiency (TE); Scale Efficiency (SE); Technological Change (TC), Productivity Change (PC); Total Factor Productivity (TFP); Profit ratio (PR); Environmental
Change (EC); EHI Economic health index (EHI).
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functions [27].
Within frontier methods, DEA has been a popular technique to
measure TFP in fisheries. Most DEA studies have used the MI to
estimate and decompose productivity changes. Walden et al. [39]
indicates that MI is advantageous for the study of productivity in
this economic sector for two main reasons. First, MI can be esti-
mated using quantities rather than prices. This feature is important
because of the lack or limited availability of price and cost data for
most fisheries. Second, MI preserves the symmetry in output mix,
which is especially important when studying multi-species fish-
eries. Under a multi-output framework, vessels can have zero valuefor one or more outputs and the MI can ensure that those outputs
stay zero.
Recent TFP studies using DEA in fishing include [39–43]. Of
relevance to this study is the paper by [39], who studied the im-
pact of IFQ on the productivity of the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and
ocean quahog fishery, reported productivity gains immediately
following the adoption of the IFQ program. However, these pro-
ductivity gains were not sustained over time. The authors sur-
mised that their results were driven by spatial changes in biomass
and regulatory access restrictions to productive fishing grounds.
Despite the popularity of the DEA method, [18,19] warn that
the deterministic nature of this methodology fails to account for
D. Solís et al. / Marine Policy 62 (2015) 347–357 351the stochastic nature of commercial fishing operations. Fluctua-
tions in stock abudance, market instablity and severe weather
inject considerable uncertainty into the harvesting process [44].
Hence, recent studies have argued that the stochastic frontier
method is better suited to study harvesting processes because it
allows for the inclusion of ‘noise’ in the estimation of the model. In
addition, the parametric nature of this method generates valuable
information on the relationship between harvest levels and con-
trol variables, e.g., factors of production, regulatory conditions,
environmental variables, etc.
Very few studies have used stochastic frontiers to measure TFP
in fisheries. Felthoven et al. [19] measured productivity changes
for the Alaskan Pollock fishery before and after the introduction of
an exclusive harvesting privileges program. Using a quadratic
transformation function, [19] found an increase in productivity
over time, which was explained by changes in regulatory condi-
tions, as well as by changes in climatic conditions, bycatch levels
and stock abundance. However, this study did not explicitly de-
compose the TFP growth into its components. O'Donell [45] im-
plemented a Bayesian framework to compute and decompose TFP
changes in the Australian northern prawn fishery using the Färe-
Primont index. This framework allows for inferences to be made
about productivity when little data are available. However, the
estimation of this model is complex and computationally
demanding.
The current study adds to the literature by estimating and de-
composing productivity changes explicitly accounting for stock
abundance. In addition, it estimates MI using a multi-output/
multi-input stochastic distance frontier (SDF) model, which to the
best of our knowledge, is the first study deriving MI from a SDF in
a multispecies fishery setting.12 Previous studies have only assessed the effect of stock abundance on pro-
duction levels [28,29,19]. However, in this study the influence of stock abundance
on the vessel's changes of productivity levels is explicitly accounted for by in-4. Methods
This study estimates and decomposes productivity changes in
the GOM red snapper fishery from 2001 to 2012 (6 years pre- and
post-IFQ program) using MI. MI is an index-based approach that
relies on radial distance functions. The SDF framework is used to
estimate the model.
4.1. Distance function, malmquist productivity index and the de-
composition of TFP
Coelli [46] indicates that in a multi-output/multi-input en-
vironment, distance functions offer a more accurate representa-
tion of a production technology than single-output models. Dis-
tance functions can be derived using input or output orientations.
Orea et al. [18] state that output-oriented models are preferable for
analyses of harvesting processes because of the quasi-fixed nature
of fishing capital. Specifically, the output distance function (ODF)
measures the maximum amount by which an output vector can be
proportionally expanded and still be producible with a given input
vector. Algebraically, ODF is depicted as
D x y y P x, min 0: / 1o θ θ( ) = { > ( ) ∈ ( )} ( )
where P(x) is the set of feasible output vectors obtainable from the
input vector x and Do(x,y) represents the output-oriented distance
to the production frontier. If Do(x,y)r1, then (x,y) belongs to P(x).
Additionally, if Do(x,y)¼1, then y is located on the outer boundary
of P(x) [46,47].
Within this framework, changes in TFP (or MI) for vessel i be-
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In other words, MI compares the efficiency of vessels in period
tþ1 with respect to their efficiency in the previous period t as-
suming the same technology (i.e., the frontier in period t). Thus, a
numerator larger than the denominator (MI greater than one)
suggests an increase in TFP.
To account for resource abundance a stock size variable is in-
corporated in the calculation of the MI. Hence, a stock corrected MI
can be computed as
MI T S
D x y S
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where Tt is the state of the technology in period t and St is a stock
abundance measure in period t.
To analyze the factors affecting productivity change the study
further decomposes TFP growth (changes in MI) into three com-
ponents: technical change (TC), efficiency change (EC) and stock
change (SC).2 TC identifies changes in the technology (shifts in the
frontier not related to changes in stock abundance), while EC
measures efficiency changes (movement toward the frontier) and
SC identifies shifts in the frontier due to changes in stock
abundance.
To decompose TFP Eq. (3) is first multiplied and divided by
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1 1 1( )+ + + :cluding stock abundance as an additional component of TFP. Due to data limitations
only the effect of the target species (red snapper) is included in the empirical es-
timation and decomposition of the MI.
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To assist with the interpretation of the MI and its decomposi-
tion, a graphical depiction of a deterministic, multiproduct (2-
species) harvesting process is presented in Fig. 3.3 MI is calculated







1 1( )+ + – represented by OB/OD in Fig. 3 – by






t( ) or OA/OC. This overall efficiency metric is measured
assuming that the technology and stock sizes are the same during
the two time periods. Thus, if the efficiency metric for a vessel in
period tþ1 is greater than in period t then that vessel has become
more productive.
Now, let us decompose the MI into its three components. EC
allows comparisons of the efficiency of a vessel across time peri-
ods. Specifically, EC measures whether a vessel gets closer to (or
further away from) the best-practice frontier. If the efficiency for a
vessel in the period tþ1 is greater than in the period t then EC is
positive and the estimated ratio will be greater than one. EC is








1( )+ + + + by D x y S, ;ot it it t( )
or OB/OF and OA/OC in Fig. 3, respectively. TC measures how much
the production possibility frontier shifts between two time periods
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In other words, if the production possibility set moves upwards
then TC will be positive, i.e., a ratio greater than one.
Finally, SC measures how the production possibility set will
shift if the stock changes, holding all other factors constant. Ex-
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Because the brenchmark period (time period t or tþ1) is set
arbitrarily the MI has customarily been defined as the geometric
mean (GM) of two time-periods [48]. In doing so, MI is estimated
as MIoi instead of MI Toi t( ). The main implication of this approach is
that TC is also calculated as a GM.4 Since the analysis also includes
SC, this component needs to be estimated as a GM as well. Con-
sequently, MIoi is estimated instead of MI T S, ,oi t t( ) which is in line
with the conventional productivity literature [39,41, among oth-
ers]. TC and SC are now calculated as3 In the following subsection random shocks will be introduced in the esti-
mation of the production distance frontier.
4 Using the MI Toi t( ) framework TC is calculated as D x y D x y, / ,ot it it ot it it1 1 1 1 1( ) ( )+ + + + +
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4.2. Stochastic distance frontier
A translog functional form was selected to model the ODF.
Coelli and Perelman [49] show that the translog functional form is
a good approximation to the true distance function and is suffi-
ciently flexible for the imposition of desirable properties such as
homogeneity and symmetry. A translog ODF model can be de-
scribed as
D y y y
x x x
x y t y




































































where Doi denotes the output distance function measure, ymi and
xki are, respectively, the production level of output m and the
quantity of input k used by vessel i, Dj is a vector of j dummy
variables and Ch is a vector of h control variables. Interactions of
the time trend with input and output quantities were introduced
to account for non-constant rate changes and for non-neutral
technical change.
To satisfy the necessary conditions for a well-behaved ODF, the
function is normalized by an arbitrary output and symmetry is
imposed by setting mn nmβ β= and kl lkβ β= [49]. After imposing
these restrictions, the study defines the distance from each ob-
servation to the frontier as inefficiency (i.e., ln Doi¼ui) and adds
a random noise variable (vi) into the model (Eq. (10)). The OSDF
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where vi, is assumed to be an independent and identically dis-
tributed normal random variable with 0 mean and constant var-
iance, iid [N(0, v2σ )]. vi is intended to capture random events, and
its variance, v
2σ , is a measure of the importance of random shocks
in determining variation in output. Conversely, the inefficiency
term ui is non-negative and is assumed to follow a half-normal
distribution. Differences across vessels in the uiare intended to
capture differences in skill or efficiency [50]. To facilitate the
interpretation of the parameters, the left side of the equation is
set to ln y1 rather than  ln y1 as suggested by [49]. Finally, TE
scores are estimated following [51].
Table 3
Evolution of key characteristics of the (sample).















2001 7538 58.52 2.63 3399 1368 952 33401 357 79 4.189
2002 7972 58.44 2.62 3588 1653 916 35317 371 91 4.189
2003 7918 60.60 2.66 3839 1999 679 3279 377 94 4.189
2004 7663 55.54 2.62 3532 1768 828 3485 400 105 4.189
2005 6484 48.99 2.53 2962 1448 916 2876 391 131 4.189
2006 6225 56.82 2.55 3696 1406 881 2238 356 126 4.189
2007 3822 61.07 2.63 2413 1759 830 1923 261 365 2.986
2008 3771 60.00 2.65 1981 2132 1018 2151 255 366 2.297
2009 3933 64.40 2.67 2038 2438 1025 1960 240 365 2.297
2010 3093 48.25 2.61 2565 1522 918 1615 294 365 3.191
2011 3347 56.19 2.69 2720 2281 1382 1914 292 365 3.300
2012 3288 63.34 2.72 3185 1774 1822 2077 284 366 3.712
Fig. 3. Illustration of the decomposition of Malmquist Index (MI).
Note: p are the production possibility frontiers in time t as function of inputs
(x) and stock (s).
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Detailed trip-level data on harvest composition, landing sites,
fishing gear and effort, fishing grounds, crew size, and vessel
characteristics for vertical line vessels that landed at least one
pound of red snapper annually between 2001 and 2012 (6 years
pre- and post-IFQ) were obtained from the National Marine Fish-
eries Service.5 The GOM red snapper fishery was selected to ex-
amine changes in TFP because it was the first fishery in the GOM to
transition from a command and control regime to an IFQ regime
and continues to be an important source of income (Fig. 1). The
analysis was limited to the vertical line fleet because is responsible
for the majority of the red snapper landings and to control for
harvesting capital heterogeneity. Following common practice in
productivity analyses, the trip-level data were aggregated into5 Vessels participating in the GOM reef-fish commercial fishery are required to
submit a record of each trip taken to the Logbook Program at the Southeast Fish-
eries Science Center in Miami, Florida. This mandatory, self-reported trip report
contains information on dates of departure and offloading, harvest composition,
landing sites, fishing gear and effort, fishing grounds and crew size. Information on
vessel characteristics was collected through the federal permit application process
by the Southeast Regional Office's Constituency Services Branch in St. Petersburg,
Florida. Information about the Logbook Program and a copy of the trip report form
are available at http://www.sefsc.noaa.gov/fisheries/reporting.htm.annual vessel-level observations to control for the confounding
effects of seasonal changes. The resultant database had 3854
(annual vessel-level) observations.
The empirical model specified four outputs and three inputs.
The four species included were red snapper (y1), vermilion snap-
per (y2), red grouper (y3), and other or miscellaneous species
group (y4). y1 was used to normalize the OSDF and impose linear
homogeneity in outputs. The three inputs used in the model were
crew size (x1), number of days fished (x2) and vessel length (x3),
which was a proxy measure for quasi-fixed fishing capital. A si-
milar input mix can be found in [18,19].
The model also accounted for resource abundance, regulatory
constraints, climate and regional variability. Biomass estimates for
red snapper (spawning biomass, eggs) were the only ones in-
cluded in the model because of the absence recent estimates for
the other jointly-caught species such as vermilion snapper and red
grouper. To control for the regulatory environment, the model
included variables to account for the length of the red snapper
fishing season and the type of license held. Depending on the type
of license held, vessels could either harvest 2000 (Class 1 license)
or 200 (Class 2 license) lb of red snapper per trip. If a vessel held a
Class 2 license then the license type dummy was set equal to one.Climate variability was controlled using the multivariate El Niño
Southern Oscillation (ENSO) index (MEI). MEI is a composite index
made up of a number of variables used to measure ENSO events,
including sea surface temperature, surface air temperature, sea-
level pressure, zonal (i.e., east–west) surface wind, meridional (i.e.,
north–south) surface wind and total amount of cloudi-
ness. Positive MEI values correspond to warm phases or El Niño
events and negative values correspond to cool phases or La Niña
events [52]. Regional productivity differences were also taken into
account. The studied area was divided into seven regions: South
Texas (A); Northern Texas (B); Louisiana (C); Alabama and Mis-
sissippi (D); the Northern Florida (E); West Central Florida (F); and
Southwest Florida (G). Area G was defined as the base level.
Table 3 describes pre (2001-2006) and post-IFQ (2007–2011)
catch composition and participation trends. As noted earlier in the
discussion, the post-IFQ fleet took fewer but longer trips and di-
versified their catch mix. Descriptive statistics of the variables
used in the model are presented in Table 4.6. Results and discussion
6.1. Production frontier
Parameter estimates of the translog OSDF model are reported
Table 4
Descriptive statistics of the harvesting activities.
Variable (units) Whole Sample Pre IFQ Post IFQ Test of
meansa
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
y1 (lbs/trip) 548 1049 500 755 648 1476 0.00
y2 (lbs/trip) 330 841 230 678 535 1075 0.00
y3 (lbs/trip) 174 414 121 317 284 546 0.00
y4 (lbs/trip) 480 914 461 884 520 972 0.00
x1 (crew/trip) 2.74 1.17 2.78 1.22 2.66 1.06 0.00
x2 (days/trip) 3.34 2.59 2.96 2.35 4.12 2.87 0.00
x3 (feet) 38.50 10.09 38.90 10.60 37.70 8.91 0.00
Area A
(dummy)
0.02 – 0.03 – 0.01 – 0.00
Area B
(dummy)
0.10 – 0.12 – 0.06 – 0.00
Area C
(dummy)
0.12 – 0.14 – 0.06 – 0.00
Area D
(dummy)
0.26 – 0.27 – 0.25 – 0.00
Area E
(dummy)
0.32 – 0.28 – 0.40 – 0.00
Area F
(dummy)
0.16 – 0.14 – 0.21 – 0.00
Area G
(dummy)
0.02 – 0.02 – 0.02 – 0.77
Class 2
(dummy)
0.59 – 0.58 – 0.61 – 0.00
Log RS stock
(eggs)b
11.07 0.79 10.74 0.76 11.54 0.56 0.00
Open season
(days)
213.06 129.34 104.55 18.62 365.33 0.47 0.00
a Test (P-values) before and after the implementation of the IFQs.
b Stock is measure as the natural logarithmic of spawning biomass, eggs.
Table 5




































Area A 0.002** (0.001)
Area B 0.005*** (0.001)
Area C 0.007*** (0.002)
Area D 0.001 (0.009)
Area E 0.003 (0.003)
Area F 0.059*** (0.014)
Stock 0.064** (0.032)
Open season 0.091*** (0.014)










a To impose linear homogeneity in outputs the right hand side outputs are
normalized by red snapper e.g., Y2¼y2/y1.
Table 6
Partial distance input and output elasticities and returns to scale (RTS).
Elasticities Whole sample Pre-IFQ Post-IFQ
y1 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.39***
y2 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.10***
y3 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.18***
y4 0.36*** 0.39*** 0.33***
x1 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.44***
x2 1.05*** 1.07*** 1.03***
x3 0.56** 0.72** 0.42**
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their GM. First-order parameters of both inputs and outputs were
statistically significant and showed the expected signs consistent
with economic theory. The null hypothesis that technical in-
efficiency did not exist (Ho: λ¼0)was rejected at the 1% level in-
dicating that the stochastic production frontier specification is
preferable to the conventional production function specification.
In addition, the standard errors for u and v were statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level indicating that skill and random shocks are
important in the description of the underlying technology.
Because the empirical model allows for the estimation of a
non-constant and non-neutral production frontier, output and
input distance elasticities and returns to scale (RTS) were esti-
mated for the entire sample (12 years) and pre- and post-IFQ
periods (Table 6). At the sample mean, partial input distance
elasticities were equal to 0.44 and 1.05 for crew size and fishing
days, respectively. The elasticity for quasi-fixed fishing capital was
0.56 showing a positive relationship between vessel size and
landings. All partial input elasticities with the exception of vessel
length were found to be statistically significant at the 1% level. The
vessel length elasticity was found to be statistically significant at
the 5% level. The findings reported in Table 6 also show increasing
returns to scale (RTS) suggesting that the present fleet is larger
than necessary to harvest the current TAC at the least cost. Asche
et al. [53] note that high RTS are a sign of overcapacity, particularly
in regulatory regimes that do not offer incentives to control ca-
pacity. Although, the RTS decreased slightly post-IFQ, the current
fleet has yet to achieve an economically optimal configuration.
Table 6 reports the estimated partial output distance elasticities
were all statistically significant at the 1% level. In general terms,
output distance elasticities capture the share of each species (or
species group) relative to aggregate landings. Table 6 shows a
significant change in the output mix post-IFQ. From a
Table 7
Evolution of total factor productivity scores for the entire sample and fleet
categories.
Period All vessels Remnant Retired Newcomer
2001–2002 0.954 0.994 0.908 –
2002–2003 0.894 0.945 0.824 –
2003–2004 0.971 0.949 1.010 –
2004–2005 0.850 0.881 0.781 –
2005–2006 0.990 1.032 0.818 –
2006–2007 0.839 0.839 – –
2007–2008 0.919 0.966 – 0.853
2008–2009 1.058 1.012 – 1.617
2009–2010 1.181 1.138 – 1.325
2010–2011 1.088 1.065 – 1.214
2011–2012 0.958 0.953 – 1.05
Pre-IFQa 0.930 0.960 0.875 –
Post-IFQa 1.041 1.027 – 1.212
a Weighted average (by number of vessels).
Table 8
Average technical efficiency (TE) levels pre- and post-IFQs by geographic areas.
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fishers’ ability to control the catch composition suggests that
management changes in one fishery may require additional
oversight of substitute species [8,25].
The empirical model also controls for red snapper abundance,
red snapper license types (Classes 1 and 2), climate variability and
season length. The coefficient for stock abundance is, as expected,
positive and statistically significant (at 5% level), suggesting that
an increase in fish abundance induces an upward shift of the
production possibility frontier. This result is consistent with pre-
vious research underscoring the importance of accounting for
stock abundance [28,29,19], among others. The coefficient for the
Class 2 license type (200 lb trip limit) is negative and statistically
significant at the 1% level indicating that those vessels that held
these licenses were less productive than their counterparts. Cli-
mate variability coefficient was not found to be statistically sig-
nificant which may be explained by two factors.6 First, red snapper
inhabits waters from 30 to 200 ft deep, which tend to have stable
temperature conditions. Moreover, [54] shows that sea surface
temperatures have been fairly stable since the mid-1990s. In ad-
dition, the temporal (i.e., annual) aggregation of the data may af-
fect the significance of the climate variable since fishers can forgo
fishing during periods of rough seas and make up for their lost
production later in the year when weather conditions are more
favorable [55]. Karnauskas et al. [54] also highlights the difficulties
in evaluating the effects of climate and weather variability on
commercial fishing operations. Finally, the fishing season length
variable was found to be positive and statistically significant at the
1% level suggesting that the added flexibility to fish year-round can
yield significant productivity gains. Specifically, the partial elasti-
city for the open fishing season variable equals 0.09.
6.2. Changes in total factor productivity and its components
Table 7 presents TFP changes over the studied period. The re-
ported estimates represent the change in the MI between two
consecutive years. Ratios greater than unity indicate an improve-
ment in productivity, meaning that more yield was obtained with
the same amount of inputs. Also, because annual estimates were
calculated as GMs, the annual average rate of change in TFP for
each year can be calculated by subtracting one from the estimate.
Between 2001 and 2012, the annual MIs ranged between 0.839
in the period 2006–2007 to 1.181 in the period 2009–2010. After
the adoption of the IFQ program, productivity declined by 8.1% in
the period 2007–2008, which coincided with substantial reduc-
tions in the red snapper quota. The red snapper quota fell from
4.19 million pounds in 2006 to 2.99 million pounds (about 30%
drop) in 2007 and then dropped again to 2.30 million pounds. in
2008 (another 23%).7 To offset the impact of the reduced quota, the
fleet, on average, prolonged their fishing trips and diversified their
landings [24]. Table 3 shows that post-IFQ fishers directed their
effort to other species, particularly vermilion snapper. In the per-
iod 2008–2009, productivity gains were first observed since the
onset of the IFQ program. In this period, productivity increased by
5.8%, and then increased again by 18.1% in 2009–2010 and then by
8.8% in 2010–2011. In the period 2011–2012, productivity fell
marginally by 4.2%.
Table 7 shows that the sexennial pre- and post-IFQ geometric6 In preliminary analysis three alternative climatic indicators were tested:
(1) the annual and seasonal average sea surface temperature (SST); (2) the Japan
Meteorological Agency (JMA) ENSO index; and, (3) the accumulated cyclone energy
(ACE). As for the MEI index, none of these variables resulted to be statistically
significant; and furthermore, including these variables affected the convergence of
the ML function.
7 Quotas are based on gutted weight.MI means were 0.930 and 1.041, respectively indicating that prior
to the IFQ program the productivity of the red snapper fleet was
declining at an annual rate of 7%, whereas afterwards productivity
began increasing at an annual rate of 4.1%.
Table 7 also reports TFP changes for the entire fleet and fleet
categories: remnant fleet, retired fleet and (post-IFQ) newcomer or
new entrant fleet. It shows that in the pre-IFQ period both the
remnant and retired fleets experienced declining productivity;
however, the retired fleet experienced higher productivity declines
(12.5% vs. 4%). Post-IFQ the productivity of the remnant fleet rose
from 4% to 2.7%. Table 7 also reports that newcomer fleet was
extremely productive reporting annual productivity gains on the
order of 21.2%. Geographically, productivity gains were more
pronounced in Louisiana and northern Texas relative to central
and south Florida because derby fishing conditions had been
common in the western Gulf [24]. Eastern Gulf catches only re-
cently increased owing to the eastward expansion of the red
snapper stock along the West Florida shelf (Table 8).
With respect to the sources of TFP change, Table 9 shows that
post-IFQ productivity gains were mostly attributable to changes in
technical efficiency rather than from technological progress or
changes in stock size. Sexennial pre- and post-IFQ averages show
that EC rose from 6.3% to 3.4% whereas TC increased from -0.8 to
0.2% and SC rose by 0.5% during the same time period. In the post-
IFQ period, EC was the main source of productivity growth ac-
counting for 83% of the TFP changes while SC and TC accounted for
12% and 5% of the observed gains, respectively (Table 9). Finally,
Fig. 4 shows that in the pre-IFQ period, vessels in the retired fleet
had, on average, lower TE levels, which was one of the anticipated
effects of IFQ programs. Most of the vessels that left the fishery
held Class 2 licenses (200 lb of red snapper trip limit).7. Conclusions
This paper investigated the impact of the GOM red snapper IFQ
program on the productivity of the vertical line commercial fleet.Period Areas
STX NTX LA MS&AL NFL CFL SFL
Pre-IFQ 0.574 0.562 0.550 0.561 0.587 0.595 0.578
Post-IFQ 0.555 0.598 0.618 0.573 0.570 0.524 0.478
Rate of Change 3.3 6.4 12.36 2.2 2.9 11.9 17.3
Table 9









2001–2002 0.954 0.953 1.002 1.000
2002–2003 0.894 0.893 1.001 1.000
2003–2004 0.971 0.970 1.001 1.000
2004–2005 0.850 0.863 0.983 0.998
2005–2006 0.990 0.991 0.999 0.999
2006–2007 0.839 0.887 0.946 1.003
2007–2008 0.919 0.921 0.997 1.001
2008–2009 1.058 1.056 0.999 1.003
2009–2010 1.181 1.178 1.000 1.003
2010–2011 1.088 1.080 1.005 1.003
2011–2012 0.958 0.950 1.002 1.005
Pre-IFQa 0.930 0.937 0.992 1.000
Post-IFQa 1.041 1.034 1.002 1.005
a Weighted average (by number of vessels).
Fig. 4. Distribution of pre-IFQ technical efficiency scores for the retired and rem-
nant fleets (2001–06).
D. Solís et al. / Marine Policy 62 (2015) 347–357356The findings of the study suggest that the IFQ program had a po-
sitive impact on the productivity of the fleet. Sexennial pre- and
post-IFQ MIs show that productivity gains rose from 7% to 4.1%.
The study also identified the main drivers of productivity
growth. It found that most of the post-IFQ productivity gains were
driven by changes in technical efficiency (83%) followed by chan-
ges in stock abundance (12%) and technical change (5%). Technical
efficiency improved the most because of the added flexibility af-
forded by the program which influenced both extensive and in-
tensive margins. Changes in the extensive margin came about by
releasing redundant capital and labor whereas changes in the in-
tensive margin came about by easing regulatory constraints such
as trip limits and fishing seasons.
In light of these results and earlier work by [25] suggesting that
the current fleet is oversized, regulators interested in spurring
productivity gains may want to consider short-run policies that
remove surplus capital and labor rather than those that provide
research and development opportunities to foster technological
improvement and/or enhance fishing skill. Once harvesting capa-
city becomes more closely aligned with the reproductive potential
of the stock, regulators may want to revisit policies that support
research and development. However, productivity gains from
common-pool resources cannot be sustained indefinitely because
quotas are based on conservative exploitation levels to protect thefinite reproductive potential of the stock. Finally, while this study
focuses on a single IFQ program, these results in combination with
the findings from national productivity reviews [30,17] suggest
that regulatory changes, especially those in the form of rights or
privilege-based management regimes can help boost productivity
in the short-run.Acknowledgements
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